ROWENA MANLUTAC GREEN VS. JEFFERY A. GREEN

ROWENA MANLUTAC GREEN VS. JEFFERY A. GREEN AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 

G.R. No. 255706 

February 17, 2025 

 

FACTS: 

 

Jeffery, a US retiree, met Rowena in a bar. Jeffery knew Rowena had two children from a previous relationship, and Rowena knew Jeffery was married to another, but that his divorce was still pending. Jeffery and Rowena got married at St. Ignatius de Loyola Cathedral in Quezon City. Later, Jeffery filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with Rowena with the RTC based on the basis of both parties’ psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Aside from documentary evidence proving Rowena's infidelity, lies, and debts, Jeffery attached a Psychiatric Evaluation Report made by Dr. Manalo-Arcena after conducting interviews with Jeffery, Rowena, Rowena's mother, and the spouses' mutual friend.  The RTC granted the petition. The CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC.MR was denied. Hence this petition. 

 

 

ISSUE: 

 

Whether petitioner Rowena is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations, so as to make her marriage with respondent Jeffery annullable under Article 6 of the Family Code. 

 

RULING: 

 

Yes. Rowena is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations so as to make her marriage with respondent Jeffrey annullable under Article 6 of the Family Code.  

 

The SC held that Psychological assessments based on testimonies of petitioner, respondent, respondent's mother, and the spouses' mutual friend may be given credence, unless there are reasons to believe that the testimonies are fabricated. As long as the totality of the evidence establishes petitioner's psychological incapacity, the declaration of nullity of marriage is warranted. 

 

The SC cited the case of Georfo v. Republic where the Tan-Andal guidelines were summarized. First, Tan-Andal established that the quantum of proof required in nullity cases is clear and convincing evidence based on the presumption of validity of marriage. It requires more than preponderant evidence but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.  

Second, Tan-Andal abandoned the guideline in Molina requiring the root cause of the psychological incapacity to be medically or clinically identified. Third, in light of the shift in viewing psychological incapacity as a legal concept, the three characteristics of psychological incapacity are restated.  Juridical antecedence is established by showing that the psychological incapacity exists at the time of the celebration, even if it only manifests during the marriage. It may be proven by "testimonies describing the environment where the supposedly incapacitated spouse lived that may have led to a particular behavior."  To satisfy the requirement of incurability, there must be a showing of an "undeniable pattern of such persisting failure to be a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse [that] must be established so as to demonstrate that there is indeed a psychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative to the other."  The requirement on the gravity of the psychological incapacity was retained, which must be "caused by a genuinely psychic cause." It must not be mere "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts," nor "mere refusal, neglect[,] difficulty, much less ill will. Although not essential, the Court in Tan-Andal considered the psychologist's expert opinion given that it was offered in evidence and found that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his marital obligations. The credibility of expert witnesses does not inhere in their person; rather, their testimony is sought because of their special knowledge, skill, experience, or training that ordinary persons and judges do not have.  

 

In ruling that the marriage is void due to psychological incapacity, the Court in Georfo gave due weight and consideration to the psychological assessment derived on sources other than the petitioning spouses. It is essential to have the psychological assessment derived from sources other than the petitioning spouse because of the obvious bias in favor of the petitioner's cause. This dilemma is avoided when another person supports the petitioner's testimony, even if the supporting testimony comes from the petitioning spouse's friend or relative. This is a realistic reception of psychological assessments considering that the friends or relatives of the alleged psychologically incapacitated spouse will not be inclined to give hostile testimonies against the latter.  

 

Thus, psychological assessments based on testimonies of petitioner and her sister may be given credence, unless there are reasons to believe that the testimonies are fabricated to favor the petitioner. As long as the totality of the evidence establishes the private respondent's psychological incapacity, the dissolution of the marriage is warranted.[53] (Citations omitted) 

 

The SC also cited the case of Datu v. Datu wherein it found that Alfredo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations, not because he suffers from schizophrenia per se, but because his psychosis has been found to be an enduring part of his personality structure.  

 

Here, the totality of the evidence presented proved petitioner's psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. Respondent discharged the burden of proof to establish the psychological incapacity with clear and convincing evidence. Aside from the Psychiatric Evaluation Report by Dr. Manalo-Arcena, respondent attached documentary evidence such as copies of collection cases filed against petitioner, the DNA test result on Abigail's paternity, and pictures of petitioner hugging and holding hands with another man, in order to prove his allegation of petitioner's infidelity, lies, and debts. The Psychiatric Evaluation Report of the parties is further given probative value, since it was offered in evidence and the psychologist conducted a series of standard tests and interviewed petitioner, respondent, petitioner's mother, and the spouses' mutual friend.  According to Dr. Manalo-Arcena, petitioner's personality structure of Borderline Personality Disorder and Antisocial Personality Disorder are characterized and manifested in her "frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment, having unstable relationships with her own mother and the petitioner, unstable self-image, impulsivity, affective instability and difficulty in controlling anger. Borderline Personality Disorder is a pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, and marked impulsivity. Meanwhile, antisocial personality disorder is a condition characterized by repetitive behavioral patterns that are contrary to usual moral and ethical standards and cause a person to experience continuous conflict with society.   

 

The string of criminal and civil cases that [Rowena] [is] facing now are indications of having failed to conform to social norms.  

 

All told, since petitioner has grave and incurable psychological incapacity, consisting of her personality structure rooted from her childhood and manifested during marriage, her marriage with respondent was declared null and void.   

*Link to full text here.